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Clinical philosophy and psychoanalysis: two ways of listening to the question of meaning

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Clinical philosophy, systematized in Brazil by Lúcio Packter in the 1990s, works with the person's worldview, language and concepts. Psychoanalysis also listens to what escapes conscious discourse: the unconscious, the symptom and transference. Both refuse ready-made answers, but neither replaces psychological or psychiatric treatment when needed, and their training programs are professional training courses, not recognized by the MEC.

There are people who look for someone to talk to without being able to point to a symptom. They sleep reasonably well, they work, they keep what they promised, they feel neither the anguish that tightens the chest nor the panic that closes the throat. What they bring is something else, harder to name: a question. What is the work that fills ten hours of the day for? What to do with the death of someone who organized the entire life of the family? How to keep believing in a choice after it has stopped making sense? These questions do not ask for medication. At first sight, they ask for thought.

The curious thing is that our culture has too many answers for them. There is the book that guarantees that purpose is hidden somewhere inside you, waiting to be found in seven steps. There is the professional who turns the question of meaning into a quarterly goal. There is the spirituality sold at weekend retreats, which offers inner peace with an expiration date. Each of these offers has something in common: they close the question quickly. And a question closed quickly tends to come back, only more tired.

On the other side, the clinic runs a symmetrical risk. Faced with someone who asks about the meaning of their own life, it is tempting to look for the disorder that would explain the question. Discouragement becomes a sign, doubt becomes a symptom, grief is given a deadline. The existential question is converted into a diagnostic picture, and the picture into a protocol. Sometimes this is necessary and correct: there are sufferings that present themselves as a philosophical question and are, in fact, illness. But not every question about meaning is a disease. Treating all of them as if they were is a sophisticated way of not hearing them.

It is at this point that two traditions of listening meet and find each other strange: clinical philosophy and psychoanalysis. I want to compare them honestly, which means avoiding two temptations. The first is that of those who come from psychoanalysis and treat clinical philosophy as well-meaning conversation without depth. The second is that of those who come from philosophy and see psychoanalysis as a machine for reducing everything to infantile sexuality. Neither caricature helps the person on the other side of the room with a question in hand.

When the question of meaning does not fit a diagnosis

Let us begin with the problem, before the schools. Imagine, as a hypothetical situation, a fifty-year-old woman who has just retired. There is nothing clinically alarming in her history. She says only that she no longer knows who she is when she is not working. The sentence can be heard in many ways. It may be the beginning of a depressive condition that deserves attention. It may be the return of an old question, postponed for thirty years of routine. It may simply be a person facing a real change that demands a real revision of what she considered important.

What distinguishes these readings is not the sentence, but what is done with it. A hasty listening picks one of the hypotheses and works from it. A careful listening sustains the indefiniteness for a while, because it knows that the same sentence performs different functions in different histories. This is where the question of meaning shows its ambiguity: it can be an opening or a defense, a search or an escape. Sometimes a person asks about the meaning of life precisely so as not to ask about the meaning of a very specific desire, one she would rather not acknowledge.

Clinical philosophy and psychoanalysis offer two ways of inhabiting this indefiniteness. Neither of the two, when well practiced, hurries to answer. But each listens to the question from a different place, and it is this difference of place that is worth examining.

An ancient tradition: philosophy as care of the self

The idea that philosophy can be a practice of care was not born in consulting rooms. It is ancient. In the Apology of Socrates, written by Plato, Socrates argues before the court of Athens that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” The sentence is usually cited as praise of thought, but in context it has a more concrete weight: Socrates is on trial precisely for asking too much, for bothering his fellow citizens with questions about what they considered just, courageous or good. The examination of life, for him, was not an armchair exercise. It was a way of challenging people about what they believed they knew.

After him, the Hellenistic schools carried this idea forward. Epicureans, Stoics and Skeptics, by different paths, understood philosophy as something one practices in order to live differently. In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus states that it is never too early or too late to care for the health of the soul. The Stoics insisted on the distinction between what depends on us and what does not, and made this distinction a daily training, not a thesis to be memorized.

The historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot devoted a good part of his work to showing this. In Spiritual Exercises and Ancient Philosophy (1981), he argues that, for the ancients, philosophy was above all a way of life, and the texts that have reached us were largely instruments of that way of life: meditations, dialogues, exercises of attention, of memory, of preparation for death. Reading these texts as abstract systems, says Hadot, is to miss half of what they did.

Michel Foucault, in his course The Hermeneutics of the Subject, given at the Collège de France in 1982, takes up the question from another angle. He observes that the famous “know thyself” was, for much of Antiquity, subordinated to a broader principle, care of the self. Knowing oneself was a part of the work of caring for oneself, not the whole of it. For Foucault, modernity inverted this relation: access to truth came to depend only on knowledge, and the subject’s work on himself was set aside as foreign to philosophy.

Why does this matter here? Because both clinical philosophy and psychoanalysis can be read, each in its own way, as heirs of this ancient concern. Both reject the idea that the truth about a life can be obtained from outside, by a specialist who looks and classifies. Both bet that something is transformed when the person speaks and is heard. The similarity ends more or less there, and it is good that it ends, because the differences are what give each its usefulness.

What clinical philosophy listens to

In Brazil, clinical philosophy is associated with Lúcio Packter, who systematized it in the 1990s. I will not describe here procedures that belong to the training and that, outside it, would only be caricatured. It is enough to say what is at the center of the proposal: clinical philosophy works with the person’s worldview, with the language they use to describe their own life, and with the concepts that organize their choices.

This seems simple and is not. Think of the hypothetical example of the retired woman. When she says she does not know who she is without work, there is in it an idea of identity, a concept of what a useful person is, a hierarchy between doing and being, perhaps inherited from family, religion, profession. Philosophical listening is interested in this architecture. It asks, for example, what she understands by “being somebody,” where this definition came from, which other definitions were once part of her life and were abandoned. The point is not to convince her of a better philosophy, but to make visible the philosophy she already practices without knowing it.

There is an important quality in this approach: it takes seriously what the person says. It does not assume, from the outset, that conscious discourse is a façade to be pierced. If someone suffers because they organized their whole life around a concept of duty that no longer holds, clinical philosophy examines that concept with the person, with the rigor of someone who knows that concepts have histories, consequences and contradictions. Many people never had the chance to do this. They spent their lives obeying ideas they did not choose and that were never put on the table.

The risk of this listening, as of any other, lies in its strong point. By taking the person’s word at face value, it may fail to notice what insists in another way, in the acts that contradict the ideas, in the repetitions that no argument undoes. A good clinical philosopher knows this, and the philosophical tradition itself has resources for thinking about the distance between what is said and what is done. Even so, it is at this point that psychoanalysis proposes a hypothesis of its own, which is worth knowing on its own terms.

What psychoanalysis hears in the same question

Psychoanalysis starts from a suspicion that Freud formulated throughout his work: what we say about ourselves is not all that is said in us. There is a knowledge we do not know we have, and it shows itself where discourse stumbles, in dreams, in forgettings, in slips, and above all in the symptom. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud shows that the dream has meaning, but a meaning unknown to the dreamer. The symptom, later, will be treated in a similar way: as a compromise formation, a solution that satisfies and punishes at the same time, and which for that reason resists being undone by good arguments alone.

There is a sentence of Freud’s that tends to irritate those who work with the question of meaning. In a letter to Marie Bonaparte, in 1937, he writes, in substance, that the moment a person asks about the meaning and value of life, he is sick, because neither of them exists objectively, and that the question indicates only a reserve of unsatisfied libido seeking another destiny. Read hastily, the sentence seems to confirm the worst of psychoanalysis: turning philosophy into a symptom.

But it is worth reading more calmly. Freud is not saying that the question is foolish, but that it has a libidinal history. The question “what is the meaning of all this?” may be standing in for another, more specific and more uncomfortable one: “what do I desire and not allow myself?”, “whom do I keep trying to please?”, “what loss can I not admit?”. Psychoanalysis does not disqualify the existential question. It asks what that question is doing at that moment, in that life, in front of that person who listens.

And here transference comes in, the concept that perhaps most gives psychoanalytic listening its specificity. Freud realized, in texts such as The Dynamics of Transference (1912), that the patient repeats in the relationship with the analyst old ways of loving, fearing and expecting. The hypothetical retired woman, in asking the analyst what to do with her life, may be repeating an old gesture: handing to another the decision about her own worth, as she did with the boss, the husband, the father. If the analyst answers, he confirms the repetition. If he does not answer, he opens the chance for her to notice what she is asking for and from whom.

Psychoanalytic listening, therefore, does not work mainly with the concepts the person uses, but with the place from which she speaks and with what she does in speaking. It is not interested only in what “being somebody” means, but in who, in that person’s history, decided who was somebody. Those who want to see how this point varies among the currents of psychoanalysis will find an overview in the text on the differences between Freudian, Lacanian and Jungian psychoanalysis, which treat the question of meaning in quite different ways.

Where the two ways of listening touch and where they part

Placed side by side, the two practices have more points of contact than their communities usually admit. Both refuse the ready-made answer. Both distrust the haste to classify. Both give the word a weight that the culture of performance rarely grants. Both, when honest, know that the person who arrives is more complex than any theory about them.

The differences, however, are not of degree. They are of wager. I will try to summarize them without turning the comparison into a table of winners.

  • What is taken as material. Clinical philosophy works above all with what the person thinks and says about their own life: their categories, their values, their way of organizing the world. Psychoanalysis works also with what escapes what the person thinks: the slip, the dream, the repetition, the symptom.
  • Where the cause of suffering is supposed to lie. For clinical philosophy, an important part of suffering may come from conflicts between ideas, from concepts that have ceased to serve, or from a worldview that has become too narrow for real life. For psychoanalysis, suffering also has a dimension of unconscious satisfaction, which explains why we so often resist abandoning what harms us.
  • The place of the one who listens. In clinical philosophy, the listener takes part in the conceptual examination more explicitly, as an interlocutor. In psychoanalysis, the analyst occupies a deliberately asymmetrical place, so that transference can appear and be worked through, rather than simply lived out.
  • What counts as change. In clinical philosophy, changing may mean reorganizing one’s own worldview, making clearer the concepts one lives by. In psychoanalysis, changing involves a different relation to one’s own desire, which does not always pass through greater conceptual clarity.

None of these differences makes one practice superior to the other in absolute terms. They make each more suitable for certain situations and less for others. Someone who suffers because they inherited from their family a rigid concept of success, and who never had the chance to examine it, may benefit greatly from careful philosophical work. Someone who has already understood perfectly that this concept does not serve them, and who nevertheless keeps organizing their life around it, may be facing something that no argument will undo. Understanding is not enough when there is satisfaction in not changing.

It is a useful distinction for the professional, including for those who practice one of the two. The clinical philosopher who notices a repetition that resists rational examination does well to recognize that he is facing another kind of problem. The psychoanalyst who treats every philosophical question as a disguise for something else does badly in not hearing that, sometimes, the person is really thinking. There is a possible arrogance on each side, and it usually appears when the theory speaks louder than the person.

What neither of the two replaces

There is a point at which honesty demands directness. Clinical philosophy does not replace psychological or psychiatric treatment when it is needed. And psychoanalysis does not replace psychiatric evaluation when it is called for. When the question of meaning comes accompanied by loss of appetite and sleep for weeks, by inability to get out of bed, by thoughts about one’s own death, the problem is no longer only conceptual nor only symbolic. An evaluation is needed from someone who can diagnose and, if appropriate, prescribe medication. Non-medical listening can accompany this process, but should not take its place.

If you are going through intense suffering, or if the question of meaning has begun to come together with the wish not to be here anymore, seek professional help. In Brazil, the CVV (Centro de Valorização da Vida) offers free support by phone at 188, at any hour.

This limit does not diminish either practice. On the contrary: a practice that knows where it ends is more trustworthy than one that promises to cover everything. Part of the discredit that affects non-medical listening comes precisely from those who advertised it as a universal answer, able to resolve anxiety, depression, marital crisis and lack of purpose in the same package. That kind of promise resembles the self-help it set out to criticize more than any serious philosophical or clinical tradition.

There is also an institutional limit that should be stated precisely. In Brazil, neither clinical philosophy nor psychoanalysis is regulated by a professional council. Training in these areas is usually offered as professional training courses, and a professional training course is not an undergraduate or graduate degree recognized by the MEC. This does not mean they are irrelevant or that anything will do. It means that responsibility for the quality of the training falls on the school and on the students themselves, who need to assess what they are learning, with whom and with what rigor. In the case of psychoanalysis, this discussion about occupation, responsibility and limits appears in more detail in the text on the profession of psychoanalyst in Brazil.

Training in clinical philosophy: what is worth examining before starting

Those who arrive here because they are thinking about training in clinical philosophy, in person or online, probably want to know whether it is worth it. I cannot answer for anyone, but I can suggest the questions that seem most useful to me, and they are different from the ones the market usually asks.

The first is about the relation of the training to philosophy proper. A philosophical listening without reading the philosophers risks becoming a conversation technique with borrowed vocabulary. It makes a difference whether the course puts the student in contact with Socrates, with the Hellenistic schools, with the modern tradition, or merely offers a set of procedures. Clinical philosophy inherits what is most interesting in it precisely from the history of thought.

The second is about limits. A good training teaches clearly what clinical philosophy does not do: it does not diagnose, does not treat mental disorders, does not replace the care of psychologists and psychiatrists. Training that hides these limits, or treats them as a bureaucratic detail, prepares poorly those who will listen to real people.

The third is about dialogue with other areas of mental health. Whoever practices philosophical listening will sooner or later meet situations in which a referral is needed. Knowing how to recognize those moments requires some familiarity with what psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis do. Not in order to practice them, but so as not to confuse the territories.

At Academia Enlevo, the training in Clinical Philosophy applied to mental health has 360 hours, distributed over 15 modules, in an online format. Like any training of this nature, it is a professional training course, and not an undergraduate or graduate degree recognized by the MEC. I mention this because anyone searching for “clinical philosophy online course” deserves to know from the start what they are and are not buying, before any other consideration.

One last question, perhaps the most important, is addressed to those thinking of training: what do you expect to do with this listening? If the expectation is to have answers to give people about the meaning of their lives, it may be worth suspecting it. The two traditions discussed here, each in its own way, teach the opposite: that the ready-made answer, even well-intentioned, tends to interrupt the work the person would need to do alone.

The question that remains open

Let us return to the situation at the beginning: someone who seeks listening without bringing a symptom, only a question about the meaning of what they live. The culture offers this person quick answers. The hurried clinic offers a diagnosis. Between these two easy exits, clinical philosophy and psychoanalysis propose something more laborious: to treat the question as material, and not as a problem to be eliminated.

What the comparison allows us to understand is that this same question can be heard in two registers. In the first, it is examined as thought: what concepts sustain it, what worldview it presupposes, what contradictions it reveals. In the second, it is heard as an act: what it is doing there, whom it addresses, what it repeats and what it avoids. The two registers do not exclude each other, but neither are they confused. Whoever practices one of them does well to know that the other exists and to recognize when the situation calls for what they do not know how to offer.

Limits remain that neither of the two resolves. We do not know in advance which listening will better serve the person who arrives. There is no guarantee that the question of meaning will have an answer, and perhaps the expectation of a definitive answer is itself part of the suffering. Nor is there any listening, philosophical or analytic, that dispenses with medical care when it is needed.

The implication, for those who listen and for those who seek, is less comfortable than a recommendation. Socrates was condemned, among other things, for insisting that people examine what they took for granted. Freud was accused of reducing everything to sex for insisting that we are not masters of what we desire. Each, in his own way, refused to close other people’s questions quickly. Perhaps the question left for the reader is this: faced with your own question about meaning, do you look for someone to answer it, or for someone to help you sustain it long enough to discover what it is really asking?

Psychoanalysis training at Academia Enlevo, in facts
Course load
720 hours in 24 modules (Método Alma Enlevo)
Duration
6 to 24 months: 6 with prior background, 8 to 9 when starting from scratch
Format
100% online; recorded video lessons and reading material, in Portuguese
Completion
final assessments and a final paper
Certificate
recognized by the RNTP (Brazil), with ID card and registration number
Requirements
18 years old (or 16 with authorization); no degree required
Analysis and supervision
optional, supported by the Método Alma Enlevo and the Campus Enlevo resources
Type
professional training course in psychoanalysis; no degree required

See the Online Clinical Psychoanalysis Course

Ulisses Jadanhi
About the authorUlisses JadanhiMaster in Psychoanalysis, Máster en Psicología Criminal (Universidad Europea del Atlántico), PhD candidate in Mental Health

Prof. Ulisses Jadanhi is a psychoanalyst, educator and creator of projects focused on human development, therapeutic listening and the development of mental health. At the head of Academia Enlevo, he works on building training paths in psychoanalysis, philosophy, self-knowledge and clinical practice, with an approach that combines theoretical depth, ethical sensitivity and a commitment to transforming lives.

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