When a crime shocks the country, the first collective reaction is usually a rush to explain. Nobody can bear for long the idea that someone like us, who took the same bus and answered in the same family group chat, did that. So two exits appear almost at the same time, in the comments, at the bar table and in part of the news coverage. The first is the monster: whoever did that belongs to another species, has nothing in common with us, and so we can sleep easy. The second is the victim of circumstances: whoever did that was produced by childhood, by poverty, by the violence they suffered, and so, strictly speaking, nobody did anything. The two explanations seem opposed. Yet they have the same function: to calm whoever uses them.
Psychoanalysis is usually summoned at this moment. People expect from it a technical word that puts order into the horror, and that is where it risks serving one of the two exits. It can make monsters, when a poorly digested clinical vocabulary becomes a label of exclusion. It can absolve, when the reconstruction of a history of suffering starts to work as an automatic mitigating factor. In both cases, theory stops thinking and starts reassuring, which is a polite way of abandoning the problem.
I want to examine what psychoanalysis actually has to say about those who commit a crime, and where it must stop. The two texts that guide me here are short and uncomfortable: the final part of “Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work”, which Freud published in 1916, and the “Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology”, which Lacan presented in 1950. Neither offers consolation. Perhaps that is why they remain useful.
Monster or victim: two explanations that protect the one who explains
It is worth looking calmly at what each exit does for us. The figure of the monster has an obvious advantage: it establishes a border. On this side, normal people, with domesticated desires; on that side, something inhuman, which erupts without reason. If the crime has no reason, we need not look for anything in ourselves that resembles it. The anger we feel toward a sibling, the fleeting wish that someone would disappear, the fantasy of revenge after a humiliation at work, all of this stays protected by the border. The monster is, in this sense, a service rendered to our self-image.
The figure of the victim of circumstances seems more generous, and it is often born of a legitimate intention: to remind us that violence has a history, that nobody is born in a vacuum, that there are inequalities that push trajectories. All of this is true and deserves to be said. The problem begins when history becomes a closed mechanism, a sequence of causes that flows into the act as water flows into a drain. In this model, the person who acted disappears. What remains is a point of passage between social forces and an outcome. And, curiously, the one who explains is also protected: if everything is determination, nobody needs to ask what the subject wanted, what they refused, what they chose within the little they were able to choose.
Notice that the two explanations eliminate the same thing. The monster has no interiority that concerns us; the victim of circumstances has an interiority entirely explained from the outside. In neither case is there someone who answers for what they did. And it is precisely this someone who interests psychoanalysis, not out of a taste for punishment, but because it is only with this someone that one can work.
What Freud saw in the “criminals from a sense of guilt”
In 1916, Freud gathered three clinical observations under the title “Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work”. The first deals with those who consider themselves exceptions, the second with those who fail precisely when they triumph. The third, the one that matters to us, has a title that still sounds like a provocation: “Criminals from a Sense of Guilt”.
The reasoning is simple to state and hard to swallow. Freud reports that, in the treatment of people who had later become respectable, memories of forbidden acts committed in youth would appear: petty thefts, frauds, in some cases something more serious. Common sense would say that these people did something wrong and then felt guilty. What the analysis showed was the reverse order. The guilt was already there beforehand, oppressive, without a definite object. The forbidden act came afterwards and brought a strange relief: the guilt, which had previously floated nameless, finally gained a concrete motive. It is more bearable to feel guilty for something one did than for something one does not know what it is.
A domestic image helps to grasp the mechanism. Think of a hypothetical child who spends the afternoon provoking the adults until getting scolded, and after the scolding calms down. Freud, incidentally, mentions something similar with children. It is not that the child likes being reprimanded; it is that the reprimand gives shape to a tension that previously had none. The punishment arrives as a kind of answer. The act provokes the punishment that organizes the guilt.
Where did this prior guilt come from? Freud linked it to Oedipal desires, to the old pair of hostile and incestuous impulses of childhood, which consciousness does not recognize but whose mark persists. One need not adhere to every step of this genealogy to recognize the force of the observation: there are acts that are explained not by the gain they bring, but by the punishment they seek. Freud recalls, at this point, Nietzsche’s figure of the “pale criminal” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the one who cannot bear the image of his own deed. The reference shows that the intuition was not his alone.
It is important to read also what Freud did not claim. He did not say that every crime is born of guilt. He said, on the contrary, that there are people who commit crimes with no sense of guilt, either because they never developed moral inhibitions or because they consider themselves justified in what they do. The text describes a type, found in a specific place, the consulting room, among people who sought treatment. To turn this into a general theory of the criminal would be to commit exactly the error that psychoanalysis should help us avoid: taking a partial explanation as a universal key.
To understand is not to justify
Here comes the first objection I usually hear. If psychoanalysis shows that an act has unconscious reasons, is it not, at bottom, saying that the person did not know what they were doing? And, if they did not know, how can they be held responsible?
The objection confuses two planes. To explain an act is to reconstruct the logic that made it possible. To justify is to declare that it was right, or at least that the person could not be held to account. Psychoanalysis does the first and has no authority whatsoever to do the second. More than that: the unconscious, in the Freudian perspective, is not an alibi presented to the judge. It is part of who the person is. To say “it was my unconscious” in order to be exempt from an act amounts to saying “it wasn’t me, it was a part of me”, which is a rather sophisticated way of continuing to be me.
There is an irony in this worth noting. Popular culture tends to imagine psychoanalysis as a machine of excuses: everything would be the fault of the mother, the father, childhood. Freud’s 1916 text goes in the opposite direction. It shows people who punish themselves too much, who seek punishment, who carry a guilt greater than the acts they committed. Whoever reads attentively finds less a theory of excuse than a theory of badly distributed responsibility, in which the subject accuses themselves of what they did not do and sometimes does something in order to have something to accuse themselves of.
To understand, in this sense, has a usefulness that goes beyond intellectual interest. Whoever understands that an adolescent steals in order to provoke a punishment that calms an anguish also realizes that punishing blindly may only feed the circuit. This does not mean dispensing with the law. It means that the law, on its own, does not reach what drives the act, and that work of listening can reach something else. The two dimensions do not replace each other.
Lacan in 1950: psychoanalysis does not suppress responsibility
Thirty-four years after Freud, Lacan was invited to speak about the functions of psychoanalysis in criminology at a congress of French-speaking psychoanalysts. The text, presented in 1950 and later collected in the Écrits (1966), is dense, and I do not intend to summarize it in full. I want to highlight one line of argument that seems central to me and that can be set out without betraying the author.
Lacan starts from an observation: crime and law go together. There is no crime outside a symbolic order that says what is forbidden, and this order varies from one society to another. This does not relativize crime; it situates it. The criminal act is always an act directed at a law, even when it seems blind. Hence the possible contribution of psychoanalysis: to help read a subject’s singular relation to the law, to guilt, to punishment, instead of treating crime as a natural phenomenon, a kind of earthquake of behavior.
The most delicate point of the text is what it says about responsibility. Lacan rejects the idea that psychoanalysis, by revealing unconscious motivations, would dissolve the criminal’s responsibility. He sees in punishment an element that only has human meaning when the subject can recognize it as a response to their act, when they can, in some way, assent to the fact that they did what they did. A sanction applied to someone treated merely as a cog in a machine, with no capacity to answer, loses exactly what made it human. Put another way: to take away from the criminal all responsibility, in the name of compassion, is also to take away from them the condition of subject.
This has practical consequences. If psychoanalysis helps to show that an act has reasons, it also helps to show that someone may come to recognize themselves in those reasons and answer for them. Analytic work, when it is possible, does not consist in convincing the person that they were not to blame, nor in crushing them with the guilt they already carry. It consists in allowing them to approach their own act without fleeing into “it wasn’t me” and without sinking into “I am only this”. It is a narrow position, and no one occupies it easily.
Lacan also distrusted the promises of a criminology that pretended to predict and classify the criminal in advance, as if there were a human type ready for crime. This distrust is healthy and remains current. Every time an infallible profile of the “typical criminal” is announced, someone should ask who will be fitted into that profile, by whom, and with what consequences.
Forensic psychoanalysis is not expert examination, and the difference matters
Many people come to the subject looking for “forensic psychoanalysis” or a “criminal psychoanalyst” with an image formed by television series: the specialist who walks into the room, observes the suspect for a few minutes and hands the detective the key to the case. It is worth dispelling this image precisely, because it produces wrong expectations and, sometimes, irresponsible practices.
Forensic psychoanalysis, as a field of study, is the encounter between psychoanalytic theory and the questions of crime, law, punishment, violence and legal and penal institutions. What Freud and Lacan said about guilt and punishment is studied there, as well as how the theory thinks the passage to the act, the relation between symbolic law and legal law, the place of the victim, life in institutions of deprivation of liberty, the effects of violence on those who suffer it and on those who commit it. It is a rich field, which broadens the listening of those who work with people crossed by these experiences.
Expert examination is something else. In Brazil, the technical assessment that enters a judicial proceeding, the report on the mental state of an accused person, the psychological evaluation requested by the courts, are duties of professionals qualified by law for this, such as psychiatrists and psychologists appointed as experts. The Penal Code, in article 26, provides for exemption from punishment for those who, because of mental illness or incomplete or retarded mental development, were, at the time of the act, entirely incapable of understanding the unlawful nature of the fact or of determining themselves in accordance with that understanding. This kind of statement, within a proceeding, depends on a formal expert examination, conducted by someone with that legal attribution.
I say this clearly because Academia Enlevo offers a Course in Forensic and Criminal Psychoanalysis, of 360 hours, and transparency is part of the proposal: the course deepens the psychoanalytic understanding of crime, guilt, violence and penal institutions, and it is precisely because it is clear about its field that it can be taken seriously. Expert examination and reports are not part of what it qualifies you for; listening, study and the qualified reading of these phenomena are. Psychoanalysis, in Brazil, is not regulated by a professional council, and the psychoanalyst exercises an occupation with its own characteristics, which is worth knowing before imagining any practice connected to the justice system. A useful reading on this is on the page about the profession of psychoanalyst.
Knowing what cannot be done does not diminish the field. On the contrary: it allows it to be used where it actually contributes, in the clinical listening of those who have committed or suffered violence and seek treatment, in the training of those who work in institutions, in more careful public discussion, in theoretical study. A psychoanalyst who knows the subject well also knows how to recognize when a case calls for referral to other professionals, and this is part of competence, not a limitation of it.
Diagnosis at a distance and the temptation of television
There is a practice that deserves direct criticism, because it has spread with the ease of social media: the diagnosis at a distance of people involved in famous crimes. All it takes is a high-profile case for confident analyses to emerge about the accused’s “structure”, their “psychopathy”, their “perversion”, their presumed childhood. All of it from photos, excerpts of testimony, neighbors’ comments and whatever else is available.
The problem is not only one of professional etiquette. It is one of method. Psychoanalysis works with the speech of someone, addressed to someone, over a period of time. What it knows about a subject is built in that relationship, with hesitations, slips, repetitions, rectifications. Outside of that, what is left is projection: the commentator sees in the accused what the theory he carries allows him to see, and the theory becomes a mirror. With an aggravating factor: the public label sticks. A clinical word attributed to someone on television can follow that person and their family for years, even if they are acquitted, even if the case shows something else.
There is also an effect on the public. Television diagnosis usually serves the figure of the monster. By saying, in a technical voice, that the accused has such and such a structure, the specialist confirms the reassuring border: that has nothing to do with us, it is the doing of another kind of people. The psychoanalytic vocabulary, which was born to show how much the normal and the pathological touch each other, ends up being used to separate them again. It is an almost perfect inversion.
That is why this text cites no real cases or names. Not out of excessive modesty, but because any comment of mine about someone I have never listened to would be exactly what I am criticizing. Whoever studies the subject seriously learns to bear not knowing about the interiority of those who appear in the news. This not knowing is not a weakness of the theory. It is the condition for it to remain honest.
And the victim, where does she stand in this conversation?
There is a risk that runs through any discussion of the psychology of those who commit crimes: the victim vanishing. Attention, which is a limited resource, concentrates on the perpetrator, on their history, on their reasons, and the person who suffered the act becomes background. When this happens, the understanding of the perpetrator, however rigorous, produces a second violence, a quieter one, which is that of disregard.
Psychoanalysis has something to say here too, and it is not little. Whoever suffers violence may carry effects that are not resolved by the conviction of the aggressor: fear that spreads to situations unrelated to what happened, shame that should not be theirs, guilt for not having reacted differently, difficulty trusting. Guilt itself, which in Freud appeared on the side of the one who acts, sometimes migrates to the one who suffered, in a cruel inversion. Listening to the victim requires not rushing her, not demanding that she forgive, not demanding that she hate, not turning her pain into material for a thesis.
It also requires care in how one speaks in public. Explanations about the aggressor’s reasons, said without attention, may sound to the victim as if what she lived through were understandable and therefore, in some way, acceptable. That is not the intention of those who study, but it is a possible effect, and whoever writes on the subject must consider it. Understanding the perpetrator and acknowledging the harm suffered by the victim do not compete with each other; when one erases the other, something has gone wrong in the reasoning.
If you have been through a situation of violence, or are in intense distress, seek professional help. In Brazil, in a situation of immediate risk, call 190. The Women’s Assistance Hotline (Central de Atendimento à Mulher) answers at 180. And the CVV, Centro de Valorização da Vida, offers free emotional support at 188, at any hour.
Schools, readings and what each one illuminates
It would be simplistic to speak of “the” psychoanalysis facing crime, as if there were a single reading. Freud offered the path of guilt, of the superego and of the need for punishment. Lacan shifted the emphasis to the subject’s relation to symbolic law and to the dignity of answering for the act. Other traditions brought other lenses: Jung’s analytical psychology, for example, thinks of the shadow as that which the subject does not recognize in themselves and projects onto the other, which helps to understand why the figure of the monster is so seductive for those who watch. For those who want to situate these differences before entering the forensic theme, it is worth reading about the Freudian, Lacanian and Jungian lines.
These readings need not be merged into a synthesis, nor disputed like rival fan clubs. Each illuminates one aspect and leaves another in shadow. What they share, at their best, is the refusal of the explanation that reassures. None of them authorizes saying that the criminal is entirely other, nor that he is entirely a product. All of them, in some way, ask that we look at the act as something that concerns a subject and, by extension, the human condition we share with him.
This last idea tends to provoke resistance, and that is understandable. To say that crime concerns the human condition seems to bring the reader too close to something he wants to keep far away. But the closeness is not moral; it is structural. Nobody is saying that everyone would be capable of anything under the same conditions. What is being said is that desires of destruction, hostility, guilt and the search for punishment are not the exclusive property of one group. The difference between those who act and those who do not exists, is decisive and must be taken seriously, including by the law. It simply does not run along a border between species.
What remains when both exits are refused
Let us return to the opening scene: a crime shocks, and society asks for an explanation that reassures. Monster or victim of circumstances. After this journey, we can say more clearly why psychoanalysis, when faithful to itself, disappoints this request.
It disappoints because, with Freud, it shows that there are acts driven by a prior guilt and by a search for punishment, which makes the criminal less foreign than we would like. And it disappoints because, with Lacan, it refuses that this understanding undo responsibility, since treating someone as incapable of answering for what they did is also to stop treating them as a subject. What remains, therefore, is an uncomfortable position: to understand without absolving, to hold responsible without dehumanizing, and to keep the victim at the center of the scene while doing so.
The limits also need to be kept in view. Psychoanalysis does not predict crimes, does not identify the guilty, does not replace investigation or expert examination, and has no authority to decide whether someone is criminally accountable. Its observations are born of a specific setting, the listening to someone who speaks to an analyst, and lose value when torn from that context and applied to someone who was never listened to. Whoever studies the subject must live with this modesty, which is not false: it is the price of seriousness.
What it can offer, then, is less an answer than a discipline of thought. Faced with the next crime that takes over the news, it is worth observing one’s own impulse to explain: to which of the two exits does it run, and what does it gain on arriving there. This observation does not solve the case, which belongs to the courts. But perhaps it keeps us from using theory, any theory, to get rid of the discomfort of recognizing that whoever did that is still someone, and that someone, besides the victim, will have to answer for it.

